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SOLICITORS' RIGHT TO ADVERTISE: A HISTORICAL
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The English Law Society Council, which promulgates and en-
forces rules governing the conduct of solicitors,' recently eased the
The English legal profession consists of barristers and solicitors. The professional sepa-
ration dates back to 1340. R. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 210 (4th ed. 1976).
At approximately the time of Edward I's reign (1272-1303), the emerging legal profession
in England divided into functionally separate branches. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 13
(1953). The higher branch, "pleaders," acted as learned counselors to their clients. The
lower branch, "attorneys," actually represented the client's person, or "stepped into the cli-
ent's shoes." Id.
The client could renounce the pleader's mistakes but was bound by the attorney's actions
since he represented the person of the client. The importance of the distinction stems from
the public perception of attorneys as "mere men of business" while the public envisioned
pleaders as professional legal specialists. Id. at 14.
The designation for legal specialists changed from pleaders to barristers in the late 1300's,
after special courtrooms containing a bar to separate the disputing parties from the public
became common. L. CURZON, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 203 (2d ed. 1979). Only barristers
could practice before the bar. W. RICHARDSON, A HISTORY OF THE INNS OF COURT 16, n.2
(1979). Attorneys generally handled details of law suits in preparation for trial and barris-
ters argued cases in court. R. WALKER, supra, at 210; B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, LAWYERS
AND THE COURTS 15 (1967). The attorneys, and later solicitors, acted as business managers
for their clients' affairs. B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, supra, at 19.
Solicitors first appeared in the mid-fifteenth century and practiced only in the Courts of
Chancery. H. DRINKER, supra, at 18. Solicitors were not recognized professionally until
around 1500. Id. The class known as "solicitors" arose within the legal profession as a result
of excessive, technical limitations placed on attorneys' activities, in addition to legal and
social developments. W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, VI 450 (1937). One author-
ity contemptuously described the solicitor as "[one] who conducts legal business on behalf
of another, but who is neither an attorney nor a barrister." Id. at 454, n.2. An early pam-
phlet (circa 1680) described solicitors as "pettifogging sophisters." See H. KIRK, PORTRAIT OF
A PROFESSION 15 (1976).
A "pettifogger" is defined as a lawyer whose methods are petty, underhanded, or disrepu-
table; one who is given to quibbling over insignificant detail; or who engages in legal chican-
ery. WEBSTER'S, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1691 (P. Gove ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as WEBSTER'S]. "Chicanery" is defined as deception by artful subterfuge, sophistry,
misrepresentation, or similar artifice. WEBSTER'S, supra, at 387. "Sophistry" is defined as
reasoning that is superficially plausible but actually fallacious. WEBSTER'S, supra, at 2174.
See also infra note 20 regarding the Sophist movement in early Greece.
The positions of attorney and solicitor duplicated one another but they coexisted until the
Judicature Act of 1873. This Act abolished any remaining functional distinctions between
the two positions and sanctioned usage of either title. R. WALKER, supra, at 210. By late in
the century, however, society regarded solicitors as more prestigious. B. ABEL-SMITH & R.
STEVENS, supra, at 19; M. BIRKS, GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW 144 (1960). The two positions
eventually merged and the lower branch of the legal profession became known only as solici-
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traditional ban on solicitor advertising.2 The Council, however, re-
stricted the right to advertise by sanctioning only press or radio
advertisements, mailings to professional connections,3 and notices
posted at the solicitor's place of business.4 The Council also enun-
tors. B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, supra, at 53, n.1.
The term "solicitor" evolved from the Norman-French "sollicitur," which derived from
the Latin "solicitaire," meaning to agitate, urge, or solicit. H. KIRK, supra, at 14. In contrast,
the term "barrister" denoted one allowed before the physical courtroom barrier known as
the "bar" and admitted for the purpose of conducting public trials in English superior
courts. WEBSTER'S, supra, at 179.
The barrister's position in the English legal system became highly specialized and barris-
ters primarily acted as advocates. Barristers, learned legal counselors, practiced at the
"bar." The "bar" simply meant the railing in the courtroom separating members of the
general public from those involved in a legal dispute. WEBSTER'S, supra, at 174. The barris-
ter conducted trials and argued legal matters before the "bench." The term "bench" collec-
tively referred to judges. WEBSTER'S, supra, at 202. The bench, located in London at the
Inns of Court, called barristers to the bar, thus giving them special rights of audience. Id. at
137. See also infra note 32 regarding barristers and the Inns of Court.
2 The Law Society Council decided, by a majority vote on June 21, 1984, to grant solici-
tors a limited right to advertise. The Council decision became effective October 1, 1984.
Council Statement: Individual Advertising by Solicitors, 81 L. Soc'y GAZETrE 1802 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Council Statement (1984)].
The Law Society Council promulgates rules by virtue of discretionary power conferred by
section 1 of the Solicitor's Act 1933 to "make rules . . . regulating . . . the professional
practice, conduct and discipline of solicitors." The Solicitor's Practice Rules, 1936, 182 L.
TIMES 266 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Rules].
Rule 8 of the International Bar Association Code of Ethics epitomizes the traditional ban
against advertising by legal professionals. Rule 8 decrees that "[i]t is contrary to the dignity
of a lawyer to resort to advertisement." THE LAW SOCIETY, A GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT OF SOLIcrrORs 84 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SOLICITOR'S GUIDE].
3 "Professional connections" probably refers only to present or former clients of the solic-
itor obtained through the exercise of his professional services. SOLICITOR'S GUIDE, supra note
2, at 106; see also infra note 173 for further discussion of solicitor's professional connections.
The Law Society announcement stated:
As from 1 October 1984, solicitors may advertise in England and Wales: (a) in
the press or on radio; (b) by direct mailing to their professional connections; (c) on
their premises.
Solicitors may not advertise by any other means unless specifically so permitted
by any Council ruling or direction. Advertising must be subject to the following:
1. The advertising must be in good taste and not of such a character as may
reasonably be regarded as likely to bring the profession into disrepute.
2. The advertising must not contain any inaccurate or misleading statement and
any factual information must be verifiable.
3. (a) The advertising may refer to the quality of service provided by solicitors
in general but not to that provided by the firm and should not suggest that the
firm is superior in its practice to other solicitors, nor directly or indirectly criticise
or compare its services or charges with those of other solicitors.
(b) No statement may be made as to quantity of work, names of clients, names
of staff other than partners, fee income, past cases or success rate.
4. Categories of work that may be advertised are limited to those of which the
firm has experience. No special expertise or specialism may be claimed.
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ciated a variety of advertisement quality and content standards.
The announcement relaxing the previously absolute prohibition on
advertising expressly stated that rule 1 of the Solicitor's Practice
Rules 1936,6 which disallowed touting,6 advertising 7 or unfairly at-
tracting business, otherwise remained in force.' The solicitor's
right to advertise, although only a cautious step, represented a de-
parture from long-standing English legal tradition eschewing any
form of competition within the profession.9
In direct contrast to the recent and restricted English right, the
United States Supreme Court bestowed constitutional protection
on attorney advertising in 1977.10 The Court classified legal adver-
tisements as commercial speech, 1 triggering first amendment pro-
5. (a) If charges are advertised, it must be stated what services will be provided
for those charges and in what circumstance they may be increased.
(b) A fee stated to be from or upwards of a certain figure is prohibited, as is the
advertising of a discount or reduction of a specified percentage or amount.
(c) A total fee for a specific service must state whether that includes disburse-
ments and value added tax.
(d) If the basis of charges is advertised it must be clearly explained.
(e) If residential conveyancing is advertised but not a charge thereof, the adver-
tisement must include a statement to the effect that if required a written estimate
of costs in respect of such work will be given. This estimate must be comprehen-
sive and accord with the Notes for Guidance for the time being in force, published
with The Society's Domestic Conveyancing Charges Form.
Council Statement (1984), supra note 2, at 1802.
6 Rule 1 states "[a] solicitor shall not directly or indirectly apply for or seek instructions
for professional business or do or permit in the carrying on of his practice any act or thing
which can reasonably be regarded as touting or advertising or as calculated to attract busi-
ness unfairly." Official Papers: The Law Society-Solicitor's Practice Rules, 1936, 182 L.
TIMES 200 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Official Papers]. The Solicitor's Practice Rules, 1936
constituted the initial rules governing the conduct of solicitors and were introduced pursu-
ant to The Law Society Council's discretionary rule-making power. Rules, supra note 2.
1 "Touting" refers to solicitation of patronage, urging with annoying persistence, or im-
portunately peddling in an annoyingly persistent manner. WEBSTma's, supra note 1, at 2417.
7 "Advertising" occurs when a merchant of goods or services calls something, such as a
commodity or a service, to the attention of an individual or the general public, especially by
means of paid print or broadcast announcement. Id. at 31.
e Council Statement (1984), supra note 2.
' See infra notes 20-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of English legal etiquette
and the professional disdain for advertising.
,0 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). The Court struck an Arizona State
Bar Association rule that acted as a blanket suppression of all attorney advertising as a
violation of the first amendment freedom of speech guaranteed in the United States Consti-
tution. Id. at 383.
" Id. Justice Blackmun explained commercial speech as expression, distinctly separate
from political debate or exchange of ideas, that only serves to encourage an economic or
business transaction. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976).
Commercial speech serves a valuable function by informing the public of the availability,
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tection. 12 Unlike the extensive protection afforded political speech
under the Constitution,3 the protection extended commercial
speech does not completely preclude regulation. The Court held as
constitutionally permissible regulations barring false, deceptive,
misleading,1 4 or unlawful I5 commercial speech. The Court also ap-
proved reasonable time, place, and manner limitations.18 Legal ad-
vertising, as protected commercial speech, can be curtailed only by
a showing of important countervailing governmental interests.17 By
classifying United States lawyers' right to advertise as commercial
speech, the Court granted broad discretionary power to individual
lawyers.18 The wide latitude given United States lawyers provides a
striking contrast to the relatively restrictive advertising conditions
imposed upon English solicitors. 9
nature, and prices of products and services, thus assuring independent consumer choice.
Commercial speech deserves first amendment protection due to a substantial individual and
societal interest in the free flow of information. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
For further discussion of the commercial speech doctrine, see infra notes 127-41 and ac-
companying text.
" Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
13 Courts generally employ a stricter level of scrutiny when a state attempts to regulate or
restrict political speech. Political speech content regulations, however, violate constitutional
guarantees of free speech. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 354 (1964); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568 (1942); but see e.g., Whitney v.
Cal., 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenk v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919). See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-Gov-
ERNMENT (1948).
Commercial speech, in comparison, may be subject to some appropriate amount of state
regulation due to its potentially misleading nature. Truthful and straightforward advertis-
ing, however, falls within the ambit of first amendment protection. See, e.g., Central Hud-
son Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
' Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771, n.24.
" Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973).
10 Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771.
" Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84. The Bates Court determined legal service quality claims in
advertisements warranted regulation as immeasurable, unverifiable, and potentially mislead-
ing. Similarly, the Court identified direct in-person solicitation as dangerously misleading
for unsophisticated consumers. Id.
In these situations, the Court felt the potentially misleading character of the barred infor-
mation justified imposition of regulations. The government's interest in protecting consum-
ers from misinformation outweighed the usefulness of the information. Id.
" First amendment protection of commercial speech guaranteed judicial approval of
truthful advertising information concerning lawful activities. See Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at
773. See infra notes 129-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of a lawyer's advertising
rights in the wake of Bates.
" Most United States lawyers still refuse to advertise their professional services. The law-
yers who choose to advertise, however, do so with imagination and enthusiasm. For example,
Ken Hur, a trial lawyer practicing in Madison, Wisconsin, deems himself the "Advertising-
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This Note examines solicitors' advertising rights. It defines the
present parameters of those rights by looking to English legal tra-
dition. It further offers a comparison of the English and United
States legal advertising rules. The first section of the Note traces
the formation of traditional attitudes disapproving legal advertis-
ing. The second section analyzes the solicitors' right to advertise as
it has evolved from English legal traditions and compares it with
United States attorneys' constitutional right to advertise.
est Attorney in America." Hur advertises his services by way of airplane banners ("Call
Attorney Ken Hur") at University of Wisconsin football games, on the side of a hearse
which he often drives ("No Frill Wills . . . $15."), on a car he sponsors in the demolition
derby ("Sideswiped? Call Ken Hur."), through sales of over two thousand personalized T-
shirts ("Been Busted? Call the Legal Clinic. 521-1111."), and by way of a television advertis-
ing campaign where he emerges from a lake in scuba gear and urges the audience to contact
him in bankruptcy situations if they are "in over their heads." L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A
SALESMAN: LAWYER ADvERTISING AND SOLIcITATION 11-12 (rev. ed. 1981).
Ken Hur's advertisements are aberrational. The great majority of advertising lawyers use
only a basic "tombstone" advertisement in the classified section of newspapers. Id. at 12.
Plain "tombstone" advertisements attract little criticism, unlike creatively flamboyant ones
similar to those of Ken Hur. Examples of controversial ones included: a score-card adver-
tisement run by a California attorney listing, by name, murder cases he has tried, their
disposition, and his standard fee of $7,500.00 for such cases; the advertisement on the front
page of the NEW YORK TIMES by F. Lee Bailey and his partner Aaron Broder noting their
preference for wrongful death and personal injury cases arising from aircraft disasters; a
photograph of the Statute of Liberty with the slogan "Yearning to Breathe Free" printed
over it presented by a Seattle, Washington, immigration lawyer; a picture of a locked brief-
case with a law firm's name emblazoned on it and a statement that the firm practices "ag-
gressive marital law;" and, finally, a picture of a taxi meter with the slogan "few things are
as frustrating as retaining an attorney, because the minute you walk into their office, the
meter starts to run" and a statement of this particular law firm's fixed fee rates. Id. at 12.
Bar associations also occasionally exercise a little creativity in legal advertising. The Ohio
State Bar Association engineered a television and print advertising campaign featuring the
limerick:
A careless roadrunner named Fred
Slipped under a light that was red,
He thought he'd go free
With a 'No Contest' plea
But now he's a jailbird instead.
and the motto, "[wihat you don't know about the law could cost you." Id. at 21. The Water-
bury, Connecticut, Bar Association took a different approach and warned television viewers
not to visit a lawyer just because they saw his advertisement during "All in the Family,"
explaining that "buying legal services is not like buying a roll of bathroom tissue. Because
with legal services, if there is to be a squeeze, it comes after the purchase." Id. at 21-22. See
generally Bergiel & Darling, Advertising of Legal Services and Fees: Comparative Issues
and Perspectives, 45 TEx. B.J. 1228 (1982) (survey of United States attorneys' attitudes
towards legal advertising); Law Poll, 69 A.B.A. J. 892 (1983) (study results showing increased
incidence of legal advertising since 1978); Middleton, The Right Way to Advertise on TV,
69 A.B.A. J. 893 (1983) (examples of attorney advertisements).
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II. FORMATION OF TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES DISAPPROVING LEGAL
ADVERTISEMENTS
A. Early Attitudes Condemning Advertising
1. England
Greek and Roman legal tradition 20 influenced early English legal
history.21 Introduction of judicial procedures22 in the late twelfth
century complicated the prior English court system and a need
arose for representation by trained advocates. 23 Clerics, the only
educated men,24 formed the ranks of the first legal advocates. The
Church, in 1207, however, forbid clergymen from any further in-
volvement in legal disputes.25 As a result of the Church's pro-
20 Administration of justice in early Greece and Rome involved only the two antagonists
and an impartial arbitrator or judge. A strong feeling prevailed that only those necessary to
the dispute properly belonged before the court. Anyone else who desired to be present pre-
sumably could only mean mischief.
Courts allowed an exception to this rule for relatives or kinsmen. Chivalry demanded
kinsmen attend the trial of a relative to show loyalty and family support. The court toler-
ated the presence of relatives but refused to allow their active participation; they played a
purely supportive role. Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48 (1935).
The "Sophist" movement developed in fifth century Greece as a societal response to the
kinsmen exception to the rule barring all but the two antagonists from courtrooms. Soph-
ists, schooled in persuasive writing and argumentation, offered prepared written and oral
arguments for legal antagonists and received payment for their efforts. Sophists presented
an unorthodox philosophy of life and, although respected for their skillful writing and
speaking abilities, earned the disdain of contemporary Greek society for their willingness to
accept payment for preparation of legal arguments. Id. at 49; see also WESTER'S, supra note
1, at 2174 for the definition of "Sophist."
Courts in ancient Greece and Rome occasionally allowed litigants without relatives the
support of a personal friend. Around the sixth century, a practice began permitting "kindly
men" to assist "poor wretches" who were without friends or relatives. Courts permitted in-
tervention on behalf of another at trial only when one party appeared helpless or without
support against a powerful or strongly supported antagonist. The judges allowed interven-
tion because the intervenor provided a public service and received no personal gain. Radin,
supra, at 49.
" Radin, supra note 20, at 48. English judges initially admitted only the two disputing
parties into court. Id., see also G. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS, 27 (2d ed. 1920).
2 Court procedures first developed under the reign of Henry II in the twelfth century.
Legal proceedings assumed a form resembling present procedures. Advocacy also became
common at this time. G. WARVELLE, supra note 21, at 27; L. CURZON, supra note 1, at 201.
13 G. WARVELLE, supra note 21, at 27.
'" See id. at 27, n.29. Few men outside the clergy received any educational training except
in the military arts. Id.
2" See id. at 27. The church hierarchy deemed such activities improper for religious men.
Some historians believe the reason barristers today wear wigs stemmed from the church's
prohibition on representational advocacy by clergymen. Priests unwilling to relinquish the
advocate's role supposedly wore a "coiffure, or close-fitting headdress," the prevailing fash-
ion for aristocratic men, to hide their tonsure. Id. at 28.
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nouncement, a specially trained class of laymen emerged marking
the beginning of a legal profession in England.2"
The English legal profession initially developed as a public ser-
vice, as in early Greece.2 7 First clergymen, and later specially
trained laymen, entered English courtrooms only in support of liti-
gants without kinsmen or friends. These representative advocates
charged no fee nor claimed any stake in the outcome.2 8 Lay repre-
sentatives, like their predecessors in the clergy, enjoyed an exalted
position in English society as esteemed public servants. The public
service tradition continued after the English legal profession sepa-
rated into barristers and solicitors in 1340.'"
The higher branch of the English legal profession, composed of
barristers,30 assumed the advocate's role in common law courts.3 1
Barristers studied and, once admitted to the bar, continued to live
and dine at the Inns of Court 2 in London. A barrister's clientele
consisted solely of solicitors.3 3 Solicitors and, prior to 1873, attor-
26 Id.
"" See supra note 20 for a discussion of the early Greek public service tradition.
28 G. WARVELLE, supra note 21, at 28. Advertising served little purpose where public ser-
vants freely provided legal services. Agate, Legal Advertising and the Public Interest, 50
L.A.B. BULL. 209 (1975).
9 G. WARVELLE, supra note 21, at 28. See also supra note 1 and accompanying text of-
fered in explanation of the divided English legal profession.
20 See supra note 1 for a discussion of the functionally divided English legal profession.
3' After the mid-sixteenth century, when the Inns of Court excluded attorneys from mem-
bership, the role of barristers grew in importance. L. CURZON, supra note 1, at 204-05. See
generally R. WALKER, supra note 1, at 210.
2 The Inns of Court, located in London, consist of a group of private unincorporated
legal associations similar to dormitories or fraternity houses. Built in the early fourteenth
century, the four primary Inns of Court are Inner Temple, Middle Temple, Lincoln's Inn,
and Gray's Inn. Officers of the Inns of Court, designated "benches," hold the exclusive privi-
lege of conferring the rank of barrister on legal practitioners called to the bar. See generally
W. RICHARDSON, supra note 1.
One authority speculated that English legal traditions denouncing advertising originated
at the Inns of Court as a natural result of the strict prohibition against competition among
barristers. Agate, supra note 28, at 209. Another authority believed the advertising ban
arose from the common law crimes of barratry, champerty, and maintenance and eventually
turned into a rule of legal etiquette based on notions of professional dignity. Comment, In
re R.M.J., 1983 UTAH L. REV. 99. See also infra note 46 discussing the early common law
crimes of barratry, champerty, and maintenance.
The number of practicing barristers remained small due to the limited amount of space at
the Inns of Court. Radin, supra note 20, at 68. Barristers received ample business because
the Inns of Court restricted the number of these highly privileged practitioners. Competi-
tion, therefore, proved unnecessary and rarely resulted. Id.
33 Lund, The Legal Profession in England and Wales, 35 J. Am. JUD. SOC'Y 134, 136
(1952).
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neys, served as Officers of the Court3 and attended to preparatory
matters. Solicitors handled routine client matters and acted as
business managers or advisors. Solicitors settled throughout Eng-
land because the nature of their function in the English legal sys-
tem demanded client accessibility. In contrast, barristers remained
centrally located in London at the Inns of Court since their func-
tion demanded accessibility to the judicial bench."5
Generally only wealthy men, often younger sons of aristocratic
families, entered the early legal profession. 6 These men, because
of their wealth, did not depend upon their professional skills to
earn a living.37 They prolonged the traditional public service orien-
tation of the legal profession and introduced, moreover, the pre-
vailing aristocratic disdain for "trade."3 8 The aristocracy regarded
competitive practices as indistinguishable from "trade" and there-
fore unseemly for an honorable and dignified profession. 9 The de-
veloping legal profession discouraged competition among advo-
cates, deeming it unacceptable, unprofessional, and contrary to the
public service goal.40 As a profession embodying ideals of honor
34 R. WALKER, supra note 1, at 210.
" Id. at 211; B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 21.
" The often prohibitive expense of obtaining a legal education effectively limited the field
of potential practitioners to those who could afford its acquisition. H. COHEN, A HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH BAR 500 (1929).
87 H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 17; R. PouND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTiQurrY TO MODERN
TIMES 100 (1953).
8 English society believed only "commoners" engaged in "trade."
The profession of law today is what it always has been, a high and honorable
calling, and no one invested with the prestige which it confers should be permitted
to degrade it to the level of a mercenary trade. The huckster, or even the 'hustler,'
has mistaken his vocation when he elects advocacy. His talents will show to much
better advantage in some other line where his commercial instincts will not be
shackled by ancient conventionalities.
G. WARvELLE, supra note 21, at 51-52. Advertising, moreover, leads to degradation of law
from a "learned and liberal profession" to a "mean, sordid, and grasping trade." Id. at 59.
The legal profession traditionally distinguished itself from trade on the basis of four pri-
mary characteristics. First, advocates owe a duty of public service, with compensation a by-
product, and they may attain eminence without material prosperity. Second, as "Officers of
the Court," practitioners administer justice with sincerity, integrity, and reliability. Third,
legal practitioners act as fiduciaries in relations with clients. Finally, advocates treat their
colleagues with candor and fairness and refrain from common business methods such as
advertising, competition, or direct solicitation of clients. H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 5.
" See H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 5. The public service tradition originated with the
legal advocate's purely supportive role. The legal profession nurtured this perception in or-
der to preserve dignity and maintain a safe distance from "ordinary business" or "trade."
Id.
40 See id. A barrister's legal education required him to live and dine at the Inns of Court.
Living in such close quarters fostered a sense of brotherhood and further discouraged com-
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and dignity and cherishing public esteem, being "called to the
law"' 1 necessitated stringently high standards of conduct. 2
The solicitor's primary duty to the legal profession obliged him
zealously to uphold and maintain professional honor and dignity.' 3
This duty demanded that he refrain from actions which would
"shame his conscience or bring discredit to his profession."' 44 The
profession also required that solicitors treat one another with cour-
tesy in furtherance of their primary duty.4  The legal profession's
public service tradition maintained that "advertising, publicity, [or
other] artifice' 46  engendered competition among practitioners,
thus violating the requirement of courteous treatment and infring-
ing upon the honor and dignity of the profession as a whole.'7 The
honor and dignity of the legal profession rested upon these unwrit-
ten but commonly understood standards.
Barristers maintained the unwritten code of conduct by virtue of
their centralized situation in London at the Inns of Court. The
controlling members in the hierarchy of barristers, denoted
petition. Id. See also supra note 32 for a discussion of barristers and the Inns of Court.
4' Englishmen believed a man "called to the law" followed a higher moral code and exper-
ienced feelings similar to those associated with a religious calling. One called to the law
exhibited a morally upright character, superior intelligence, and gifted imagination. H.
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 5.
Roscoe Pound described the legal profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as
a common calling in the spirit of public service." R. POUND, supra note 37, at 5.
42 H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 6. Advertising, indicative of "trade," fell short of the high
standard demanded of legal professionals. The legal profession considered advertising inap-
propriate and demeaning. Professional standards required that lawyers refrain from any ac-
tion that could discredit the profession. Id. See also supra note 38 and accompanying text
discussing prevailing attitudes about "trade."
3 H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 6.
" Id. In addition to the lawyer's primary duty, the profession insisted upon loyalty and
strict adherence to tradition. Id. at 7. The advocate remained, moreover, accountable to the
Court, to the profession as a whole, and to professional traditions. Id. at 6.
8 See id. The profession exhorted practitioners to respect the opinions of their peers. Id.
4' English law specifically forbid barratry, champerty, and maintenance practices tending
to encourage competition. These unacceptable practices stimulated lawsuits and resulted
from improper motivations, such as the desire to make money from lawsuits.
The Statute of Conspirators in 1305 prohibited acts of maintenance. Radin, supra note
20, at 63. Maintenance occurred by "an officious or unlawful intermeddling" in an action
between others by providing money or other services. WnsTER's, supra note 1, at 1362.
The Statute of Westminster I in 1275 first mentioned champerty as an offense. Radin,
supra note 20, at 62. Champerty consisted of maintenance, plus an agreement to share the
proceeds upon resolution of the dispute. WEBsTER's, supra note 1, at 372.
Barratry became a formal, statutory offense in the sixteenth century. Radin, supra note
20, at 64. Barratry involved exciting, encouraging, or maintaining quarrels. WEBSTER'S,
supra note 1, at 178.
11 H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 6.
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"benches," enforced the strict professional rules of behavior. Solic-
itors, scattered throughout England, initially experienced enforce-
ment problems due to the absence of central professional control.
A number of London solicitors and attorneys joined together in
1739 to remedy this defect and formed the Society of Gentleman
Practisers in the Courts of Law and Equity in an attempt to legiti-
mize and guide the lower branch of the emerging profession.48 The
Society established goals of professional honor and dignity but re-
mained solely a London organization. 9 A national Law Institution
developed in 1825 and, over a period of years, eclipsed the London
Society of Gentleman Practisers.50 The Law Institution initiated
formal disciplinary procedures for solicitors who violated profes-
sional standards.5 1 A Supplemental Charter, introduced in 1903,
changed the organization's name for the final time to The Law
Society.2
The basic constitutional document of The Law Society, the 1845
Charter,53 defined the organization's purpose as "promoting profes-
sional improvement and facilitating the acquisition of legal knowl-
edge."'54 To further the stated purpose, rules governing the conduct
of solicitors were advanced in a series of supplemental acts enacted
4" R. WALKER, supra note 1, at 210. The present-day Law Society developed from the
Society of Gentleman Practisers. Id.
Solicitors also gradually obtained a monopoly over land transactions. The monopoly over
land transactions boosted solicitors' respectability since land represented the only respected
form of wealth in England until late in the nineteenth century. H. KIRK, supra note 1, at 14.
Land ownership necessitated the services of a solicitor; landowners required solicitors' ser-
vices for acquisitions, transfers, sales, bequests, or any other disposition of real property. B.
ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 14. The perceived connection between solicitors
and land enhanced enormously solicitors' position in English society. See H. KIRK, supra
note 1, at 16.
'9 H. KIRK, supra note 1, at 23. The founding members sought to enunciate and improve
professional standards. The founders also perceived a need on the part of the general public
and individual solicitors for such a body to represent the entire profession. Id.
00 Id. at 28. The Law Institution formally incorporated in 1831 by Royal Charter. Id. at
33. The Royal Charter also changed the designated appellation of the Law Institution to the
Society of Attorneys, Solicitors, Proctors and Others Not Being Barristers Practising in the
Courts of Law and Equity in the United Kingdom. This cumbersome but descriptive title
remained in force until 1903. Id.
11 Id. at 29. Professional standards, uncodified at this time, consisted of traditional mores
of professional behavior. See generally E. CHRISTIAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF SOLICITORS 111
(1896).
11 H. KIRK, supra note 1, at 33.
53 The 1845 Charter replaced the Law Institution's original Royal Charter of 1831. Id. at
36.
" R. WALKER, supra note 1, at 211.
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after and annexed to the 1845 Charter.5 5 The Solicitors Act of 1974
consolidated all previous legislation and enumerated specific prac-
tice rules. 56
The Law Society exercised significant control over solicitors by
virtue of the practice rules. 57 The Law Society pursued four impor-
tant functions, as initially identified in the 1845 Charter, consisting
of education, regulation, discipline, and representation of the pro-
fession. 58 Solicitor education occurred through information pro-
vided by the Society on relevant changes in the law, 59 and through
lectures, refresher courses, and annual legal seminars2 ° The Law
Society regulated solicitors by virtue of legislative enactment.61
Powers of investigation and, if necessary, instigation of proceed-
ings62 for violations of professional standards served to meet the
disciplinary function. Finally, The Law Society represented the le-
gal profession in the public sector and sought to promote and
maintain good public relations."
English legal professionals, as respected public servants, enjoyed
a position of considerable esteem in the rigid English class struc-
ture. The English legal profession, seeking to maintain public es-
teem and profession dignity, demanded high standards of conduct
from solicitors. The advertising ban arose in England as a result of
traditional aristocratic attitudes condemning advertising as indica-
tive of "trade." The legal profession endeavored to uphold strict
5 H. KIRK, supra note 1, at 36.
R. WALKER, supra note 1, at 211.
Solicitors voluntarily join The Law Society although The Society's power statutorily
extends over all solicitors. Id. At present, over 85% of all practicing solicitors belong to The
Law Society. Id.
" See id. at 212.
" The Law Society communicates with its members through the GAZETTE, a weekly publi-
cation containing news items, comments on recent legal and professional developments, and
reports from local Law Societies and specialty groups. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF A
SOLICITOR'S PRACTICE 12/8 (P. Purton, D. Andrews & L. Brindley eds. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as SOLICITOR'S PRACTICE].
'0 R. WALKER, supra note 1, at 212.
" Section 31 of the Solicitor's Act, 1974 empowered The Law Society Council to make
rules regulating professional practice, conduct, and discipline. Id.
0' The Law Society, solicitors, or members of the public may institute disciplinary pro-
ceedings. The Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal, a statutorily independent body, handles dis-
ciplinary actions. Id.
"If a solicitor fails to observe the proper standards, The Law Society has power to investi-
gate and if necessary take action; for example, his practising certificate can be restricted or
refused, which is a disciplinary matter, or his books of account can be inspected, which is an
administrative procedure." SOLICITOR'S PRACTICE, supra note 59, at 12.3.8.
0' See R. WALKER, supra note 1, at 212.
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standards of conduct so as not to offend traditional notions of pro-
fessional dignity.
2. United States
When the English settled the American colonies, they trans-
planted formal English legal institutions, procedures, and tradi-
tions.6 4 The distinctive functional bifurcation of the legal profes-
sion survived, however, in only a few colonies, 5 and the American
legal profession merged into a single category known as attorneys
or lawyers." English legal attitudes also travelled to America, in-
cluding the traditional ban on attorney advertising.
Prior to the American Revolution, colonial young men interested
in law obtained their legal education at the Inns of Court in
London.6 7 A legal education at the Inns of Court involved constant
contact with English barristers and solicitors, formal legal proce-
dures, and long-standing professional traditions, including the pro-
hibition on legal advertisements. The close living and study ar-
rangements at the Inns of Court instilled traditional English legal
values in the young colonial men. On their return, these young men
became leaders in the emerging American bar where they perpetu-
ated the ethical standards and legal traditions imposed upon En-
glish legal practitioners."
After the American Revolution,69 a spirit of "independence" per-
See 1 A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 6 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as 1 A. CHROUST].
" The division disappeared in even these few aberrational colonies by the end of the
Revolution. See id. at xvii for the colonies that abolished and those that attempted to main-
tain the division.
66 Each colony existed as a distinctly separate entity with its own government, body of
laws, and judiciary. Id. at 4. Thus the United States, unlike England, developed a decentral-
ized judiciary system. The colonies failed to sustain the professional dichotomy due to the
decentralized legal system, sparse number of practitioners, and correspondingly small
amount of legal business during the early colonial period. Id. at xvii-xviii. The English
maintained the professional split because the bar remained centrally located at the Inns of
Court in London.
67 H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 19.
88 Id.; 1 A. CHROUST, supra note 64, at 36. As a result of the high standards, the legal
profession enjoyed a respected position in early colonial society. Alexis de Toqueville ob-
served, after his well-known tour of America, that American lawyers "form the highest polit-
ical class and the most cultivated circle of society. If I were asked where I place the Ameri-
can aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation. . . that it occupies the judicial bench and
bar." A. DE ToQuEvILLE, THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ITS POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS, REVIEWED AND EXAMINED 304 (1851).
69 The American Revolution ended on October 19, 1781, when the British signed the Arti-
cles of Capitulation at Yorktown. 21 J. OF CONTINENTAL CONG. 1071 (1912).
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meated the American bar and prompted a drive toward disassocia-
tion from English legal formalities. 70 Colonists, moreover, per-
ceived lawyers as an unnecessary English formality7' and
attempted, for a time, to administer justice without their aid.72
Public hostility toward an established legal profession grew during
the period of Jacksonian democracy 73 and several states passed
laws recognizing the "natural right" of every "morally upstanding"
person to practice law.74 These laws discouraged the acquisition of
traditional legal values.7 5 The organized prejudice against profes-
sionally trained legal practitioners led to the emergence of a cor-
rupt and often incompetent group of men offering their services as
attorneys. 76
While the quality of the American legal practitioner declined,
the quality of the judiciary improved. Independent state courts op-
erated on a regular basis and followed rigid procedural rules.77 A
strong court system, to administer justice effectively, depended
upon an educated and disciplined bar. The degeneration in the
standard of legal practitioners and the corresponding resurgence of
the judiciary prompted a movement in the late nineteenth century
to reestablish professional education, training, and character re-
quirements. 78 State bar associations, organized by attorneys,79 led
70 See H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 19; 2 A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
IN AMERICA 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 2 A. CHROUST]. A side effect of the Revolution,
unfortunately, developed as an unreasonable dislike of all things British, including the En-
glish method of administering justice. Id. at 5.
" Popular colonial opinion viewed the legal profession as an institutional embodiment of
the English class system. H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 19.
72 Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, in particular, sought to eradicate the entire legal pro-
fession. 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 70, at 28-29.
71 Id. at 331. Jacksonian principles focused on individualism and egalitarianism. Jacksoni-
ans opposed formation of an elite, privileged legal profession as contrary to true democratic
principles. Agate, supra note 28, at 210.
"' Indiana (1850); Michigan (1850); New Hampshire (1842); Maine (1843); Wisconsin
(1849). H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 19. Other states insisted upon only minimal educa-
tional requirements before allowing qualification as a lawyer. Id.
7 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 70, at 331.
76 Id. Deterioration of the entire legal system resulted from the relaxed standards. Cor-
ruption ran rampant throughout the legal profession after the Civil War. Agate, supra note
28, at 210.
77 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 70, at 286.
7s H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 20. A number of formally trained attorneys gathered to-
gether in 1878 and formed the American Bar Association (ABA). The ABA failed to assert
any real influence on the profession, however, until the twentieth century. Agate, supra note
28, at 210.
9' 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 70, at 286. Local "bar meetings," involving all practicing
lawyers within a given area, first became common in the mid-1700's. The bar meetings dis-
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the movement to revitalize professional standards.8 0
The state bar associations recognized that protection of the pub-
lic necessitated careful examination and evaluation of lawyers.
Each state responded by initiating education, training, and charac-
ter examinations to assess the worthiness of candidates aspiring to
the legal profession."1 To maintain standards of professional qual-
ity, the bar associations initiated written regulations governing the
conduct of lawyers.8
2
B. Introduction of a Formal Ban on Legal Advertisements
The advertising prohibition remained merely an unwritten pro-
fessional tradition8 3 in England until codification of the Solicitor's
Practice Rules in 1936.84 The Law Society introduced the Practice
banded during the Civil War period. Id. Around 1875, organized bar meetings became popu-
lar once more. H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 20.
80 H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 20.
' Id. Roscoe Pound stated:
It is the bar association, not the individual lawyer that can maintain high edu-
cational standards insuring a learned profession, that can maintain high standards
of character as a prerequisite of admission to practice, that can formulate and
maintain high standards of ethical conduct in relations both with clients and with
courts. The public has a deep interest in having a well-organized bar, part of the
machinery of administering justice in a complex social and economic order.
R. POUND, supra note 37, at 11.
"1 The Alabama State Bar Association, in 1887, introduced the first written legal Code of
Ethics in America. Recent Decision, Attorney Advertising that is not False, Misleading or
Deceptive is a Protected Form of Commercial Speech, 52 Miss. L.J. 679, 681 (1982). A
series of lectures by Judge George Sharswood prompted the Alabama Code. Id. at 681, n.16.
The 1887 Alabama Code served as a model for the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted
in 1908 by the ABA. Id. at 682. See also infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text relating
to the 1908 Canons. The ABA amended the Canons several times and, in 1969, the Code of
Professional Responsibility replaced the Canons. Id.; Agate, supra note 28, at 210. See also
infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text with regard to the 1969 Code. In 1983, the ABA
promulgated the MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT to supersede the 1969 Code. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES]. See
also infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text dealing with the MODEL RULES.
The Law Society contended the Disciplinary Committee, a separate entity, long re-
garded solicitor advertising as professional misconduct. This assertion is unverifiable, how-
ever, since Disciplinary Committee decisions were not published. See Attanasio, Lawyer Ad-
vertising in England and the United States, 32 Am. J. COMP. L. 493, 495 n.12 (1984); Rules,
supra note 2, at 266.
84 The Solicitor's Act 1933 conferred regulatory and disciplinary powers over solicitors on
The Law Society. Official Papers, supra note 5, at 200; Rules, supra note 2, at 266. Prior to
this enactment, courts exercised disciplinary power over solicitors. M. BIRKS, supra note 1,
at 272.
In one reported case, a court found a solicitor guilty of professional misconduct for "tout-
ing." In re a Solicitor [1912] 1 K.B. 302 (See "touting," supra note 6). Judge Darling found
the solicitor's conduct reprehensible because professional contemporaries of "good repute
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Rules to curb abuses occurring within the profession and to pro-
vide solicitors with specific guidelines for conducting legal busi-
ness.85 The rules purportedly enhanced public esteem for the legal
profession."8 Rule 1 addressed the issue of solicitor advertising and
imposed a comprehensive ban.8 7
Rule 188 prohibited three types of behavior: touting,89 advertis-
ing,90 and unfairly attracting business.9 1 Touting involved oral or
written promotion by a solicitor, a member of his staff, or someone
acting on his behalf.9 2 Advertising encompassed a much wider
range of actions.9 s Actual interpretation and enforcement of the
advertising prohibition, however, contemplated a less restrictive
standard than indicated by the rule's precise wording.94 The rule,
as applied, disallowed most personal announcements in the nonle-
and competency" would reasonably regard the conduct as "disgraceful and dishonourable."
In re a Solicitor [1912] 1 K.B. at 312. Judge Hamilton wrote "[ilt is obvious that the con-
duct of a solicitor in his profession must be judged by the rules of his profession and by the
standard which its members set up not only for their brethren, but for themselves." Id. at
314.
85 Rules, supra note 2, at 266.
86 Id.
81 See Official Papers, supra note 5, at 200 for the text of rule 1 (1936) (version).
The Law Society deemed rule 1 a "general prohibition" with "wide terms." The Law Soci-
ety noted that rule 1 did not bar insertion by a solicitor of his name, address, and descrip-
tion of practice in a legal directory. Rules, supra note 2, at 266.
" See supra note 5 for the text of rule 1 (1936 version).
8 See supra note 6 for the definition of "touting."
90 See supra note 7 for the definition of "advertising."
91 "Unfairly attracting business" pertained to relations between solicitors. The legal pro-
fession, as a public service, traditionally focused attention on maintaining its aggregate pro-
fessional reputation and discouraged competition among individual solicitors. Any action by
an individual solicitor which gave him an advantage over other solicitors, the profession
deemed "unfair." Solicitor's Guide, supra note 2, at 67. See also T. LUND, A GUIDE TO THE
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND ETIQUETTE OF SOLICrrORS 7 (1960).
Unfair attraction of business occurred, according to Lund, when a solicitor indicated his
availability and willingness to accept client instructions on a legal matter on a paying basis.
A presumption of unfair attraction of business arose due to circumstances indicating the
solicitor's preferred position. T. LUND, supra, at 22.
Lund, commonly recognized as the authority on the subject, elaborated on permissible
and objectionable conduct under the rules until The Law Society issued its GUIDE TO PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS in 1974. See SoucrroR's PRACTICE, supra note 59, at 12/8.
See also infra note 98 for the text of rule 1 (1974 version).
92 T. LUND, supra note 91, at 7.
" Lund indicated that an exact line of demarcation between acceptable and objectionable
advertising conduct appeared impossible under the rule as presently worded and applied. T.
LUND, supra note 91, at 8.
Id. For example, nameplates and window lettering at the solicitor's place of business,
solicitor's listings in legal directories, and advertising brochures in solicitor's offices qualified
as acceptable advertising formats, subject to certain restrictions. Id. at 9-13.
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gal press but allowed publication of similar information in legal
periodicals or directories.95 Rule 1 also prohibited identification of
a solicitor in his professional capacity on radio or television.96 The
third category, unfairly attracting business, acted as a general pro-
hibition and incorporated the first two categories within its broad
sweep.97 The Law Society amended the Solicitor's Practice Rules
in 1974, but rule 1 remained substantially the same.e
America adopted the English attitude denouncing legal advertis-
ing, along with other English legal traditions, during the early colo-
nization period." Early American lawyers, trained at the Inns of
Court, formalized the advertising ban in certain colonies. 100 Judge
95 Id. at 16. Only bare announcements containing information such as change of address,
telephone number, office hours, retirement of a partner, or dissolution of a partnership
proved acceptable for nonlegal periodicals. Id. at 15-16.
"Id. at 19. The prohibition against solicitor radio or television announcements first ap-
peared in Lund's 1960 interpretation of the Practice Rules.
The Law Society occasionally allowed solicitors to broadcast talks on legal subjects, but
always required The Law Society's prior approval of content and format. The rationale be-
hind this policy, as explained by The Law Society, was to maintain and to enhance profes-
sional reputation by exercising strict control over broadcast material. Id. at 19-20.
T. LuND, supra note 91, at 7.
H. ADAMSON, THE SOLICrroR's Acr 1974, at iii (1975). Rule 1, as amended in 1974:
A solicitor shall not obtain or attempt to obtain professional business by (a)
directly or indirectly without reasonable justification invite instructions for such
business, or (b) doing or permitting to be done without reasonable justification
anything which by its manner, frequency, or otherwise advertises his practice as a
solicitor, or (c) doing or permitting to be done anything which may reasonably be
regarded as touting.
Id. at 157. See also supra note 5 for the wording of rule 1 prior to 1974.
The 1974 Act also established the Professional Purposes Committee as the body responsi-
ble for overseeing standards of professional conduct. The Act advised solicitors to contact
the Committee with any questions regarding advertising. SOLICITOR'S PRACTICE, supra note
59, at 12/12.
Rule 1, as amended, continued the prohibition on newspaper, radio, or television adver-
tisements by individual solicitors and imposed numerous restraints on permissible quasi-
advertising formats such as nameplates, window lettering, signs inside solicitor's offices, tele-
phone directories, and law lists. SOLICrroR's GUIDE, supra note 2, at 93-107. The amended
rule relaxed the prior absolute prohibition on advertising and allowed corporate legal adver-
tisements. Id. at 101.
" See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the colonization pe-
riod and resultant establishment of English legal traditions.
'00 The young American men studying law at the Inns of Court came from Boston, New
York, Philadelphia, and throughout the South. H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210. At the
Inns of Court, these young men learned the traditional English aversion to anything ap-
proaching advertising. See generally T. LEAMING, A PHILADELPHIA LAWYER IN THE LONDON
COURTS 71 (2d ed. 1912).
Lawyers in Suffolk County (now in the Boston, Massachusetts, area) agreed in 1784 to
ban solicitation of clients to prevent "ambulance chasing." 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 70, at
135. Advertising divorce services met with hostility throughout the colonies as encouraging
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George Sharswood, 10 1 in his lectures on the legal profession in the
late 1800's,1o2 advocated regulation but not complete prohibition of
attorney advertisements.' 0s The first Code of Legal Ethics,
prompted by Judge Sharswood's lectures and introduced in 1887
by the Alabama State Bar Association, only denied direct, in-per-
son solicitation of legal business. 04 The 1908 American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA) Canons of Professional Ethics' 5 modeled after the
Alabama Code, barred attorney advertising in general terms and
instead expressly encouraged word-of-mouth advertising of profes-
sional reputation. 06
the dissolution of marriages and the breakdown of the family. Divorce service advertise-
ments violated public policies seeking to preserve the sanctity of the family. Id.
Few jurisdictions issued absolute prohibitions, however. Abraham Lincoln, an Illinois law-
yer well-known for his integrity and high moral standards, advertised his legal services in
the August 10, 1838, edition of the SANGAMON JOURNAL. L. ANDREws, supra note 19, at 1;
Attanasio, supra note 83, at 502-03; Boden, Five Years After Bates: Lawyer Advertising in
Legal and Ethical Perspective, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 547-48 (1982).
101 George Sharswood studied law under one of the most distinguished advocates at the
bar in the early 1800's. Once admitted to practice, Sharswood remained interested in philos-
ophy and active in politics. In 1845, the Philadelphia bench appointed Sharswood, 34 years
old at the time, to his first judgeship position. He served as a judge in a number and variety
of courts, including Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1879 until his death in 1883.
Judge Sharswood continually advocated professional ethics and in 1854 wrote his ESSAY
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS memorializing his lecture series on the "Aims and Duties of the
Profession of the Law." G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Memorial (5th
ed. Philadelphia 1896) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1854).
102 Attanasio, supra note 83, at 502-03. See also supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text
pertaining to Judge Sharswood's lectures.
103 See Recent Decision, supra note 82, at 681. See also Francis & Johnston, The Em-
peror's Old Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 WILLAMETM L.J. 221, 226 (1977).
Judge Sharswood's 1854 work on legal ethics omitted any reference to attorney advertising.
Attanasio, supra note 83, at 503.
104 See Attanasio, supra note 83, at 503. Another work on legal ethics allowed business
information printed in newspapers and magazines of good repute. Id. See also G. WARVELLE,
ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 60 (1902).
The Alabama Code of Ethics provided: "[n]ewspaper advertisements . . . tendering pro-
fessional services to the public, are proper; but special solicitation of particular individuals
to become clients ought to be avoided." H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 356.
10I The Canons scattered advertising restrictions throughout seven different locations. Ca-
nons 27, 28, 33, 40 , 43, 45, and 46 all concerned legal advertising. Smith, Canon 2: "A
Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available, 48 TEx. L. REV. 285, 291 (1970).
106 A formal, written ban on attorney advertising did not exist until 1908. The legal pro-
fession generally frowned on attorney advertising prior to 1908 although a strict ban was not
in existence. Most American lawyers pursued a general practice in small communities and
conducted legal business on a personal basis with familiar neighbors, friends, and relatives.
Advertisements, under these circumstances, proved unnecessary. L. ANDREwS, supra note
19, at 1.
The turn of the century brought changes in society and the legal profession. Communities
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The ABA amended the Canons several times10 7 and, in 1969,
adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility.10 8 Canon 2109 of
grew in size, lawyers developed specialized practices, and legal regulations permeated rou-
tine aspects of daily life. The average citizen lacked legal sophistication and experienced
confusion when confronted with legal problems. Id. In response to the societal and profes-
sional changes, the ABA codified professional rules of conduct in 1908. See Casenote, In re
R.M.J.: Easing Restrictions on Attorney Advertising, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 455, 456 (1982). See
also supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text concerning adoption of the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics.
Canon 27 of the 1908 Canons dealt with legal advertising. Recent Decision, supra note 82,
at 682. Canon 27, unlike the 1887 Alabama Code that allowed newpaper advertising, deemed
newspaper advertisements, circulars, and direct communications intolerable and in defiance
of professional tradition. H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 215; compare id. at 356. In 1937, the
ABA amended the Canons to allow advertising in law lists. Id. at 216. Other advertising
formats eventually found approval with the ABA. For example, in 1938, the ABA exempted
attorney listings in legal directories and advertisements by organized bar groups from the
advertising ban so long as the advertisement contained educational information and ap-
peared dignified. Id. at 216.
Canon 27, applicable to direct or indirect lawyer advertising, stated:
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertise-
ments, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not war-
ranted by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for professional employment
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph
to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is en-
gaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation,
offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profession and are reprehensible;
but the customary use of simple professional cards is not improper.
Publication in reputable law lists in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by these canons of brief biographical and informative data is
permissible. Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement
of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, tele-
phone numbers, cable addresses; branches of the profession practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended; with dates of gradua-
tion, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and offices
in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities; foreign language ability; the fact of listings in other reputable
law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent,
the names of clients regularly represented. A certificate of compliance with the
Rules and Standards issued by the Standing Committee of Law Lists may be
treated as evidence that such list is reputable.
It is not improper for a lawyer who is admitted to practice as a proctor in admi-
ralty to use that designation on his letterhead or shingle or for a lawyer who has
complied with the statutory requirements of admission to practice before the pat-
ent office, to so use the designation "patent attorney" or "patent lawyer" or
"trademark attoney" or "trademark lawyer" or any combination of those terms.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS at 346 (1908) [hereinafter cited as CANONS].
"'The ABA amended Canon 27 in 1937, 1940, 1942, 1943, and 1951; Canon 43, in 1928,
1933, 1937, and 1943; Canon 46 in 1933; and Canon 40 in 1928. H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at
215-18.
'" See Recent Decision, supra note 82, at 682. Canon 2 and the accompanying Ethical
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the 1969 Code addressed the advertising issue. It imposed a blan-
ket prohibition on individual advertising, 110 solicitation,"' cham-
perty, 1" 2 barratry,"' and maintenance," 4 while it supported gen-
eral promotional advertisements by the organized bar. 1 5 Until
recent Supreme Court decisions rendered such prohibitions uncon-
stitutional, 1 6 the Code perpetuated the traditional advertising
ban." 7 The ABA identified four reasons for prolonging the prohibi-
tion: fear of fraudulent client relations,"'" increase in unnecessary
litigation," 9 potential damage to professional honor and dignity, 20
and an apprehension that advertisements rather than legal ability
would guide members of the public in their representational
decisions.' 2'
III. COMPARISON OF SOLICITOR AND LAWYER ADVERTISING RIGHTS
A. Evolution of the Right to Advertise
1. United States
The relaxation of the advertising ban in the United States
Considerations (EC's) and Disciplinary Rules (DR's) dealt with lawyer advertising.
Canons express "axiomatic norms" from which the Ethical Considerations and Discipli-
nary Rules take form. Ethical Considerations represent aspirational objectives toward which
all lawyers should strive. Disciplinary Rules, mandatory regulations, "state the minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary ac-
tion." MODEL CODE OF PROFSSIONAL REsPONsmILr Preamble and Preliminary Statement 2
(1982) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
Canon 2 stated: "A lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make
legal counsel available." MODEL CODE at 7. See also infra note 144 for the text of DR 2-101.
109 See supra note 108 for the text of Canon 2.
110 See supra note 7 for the definition of "advertising."
"' "Solicitation" occurred when one entreated, importuned, pressured, or otherwise en-
ticed another. WEBSTER'S, supra note 1, at 2169.
"' See supra note 46 for the definition of "champerty."
"s See supra note 46 for the definition of "barratry."
114 See supra note 46 for the definition of "maintenance."
1l Smith, supra note 105, at 287. Canon 2, by prohibiting individual advertisements and
allowing organized bar advertisements, subordinated individual to group professional
interests.
16 See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 350; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 191.
"7 Miss. L.J., supra note 82, at 682.
11' Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Professional Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1187 (1972).
11 Id. at 1188-89. See also Holloway v. Lowe, 7 Port. 488, 491 (Ala. 1838); In re Davidson,
64 Nev. 514, 525, 186 P.2d 354, 359 (1947).
110 Note, supra note 118, at 1189-90.
191 Id. at 1184-85. See also State v. Nichols, 151 So. 2d 257, 268 (Fla. 1963).
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started in the middle of the twentieth century.' 2 Rapid population
growth, industrialization of the economy, and large-scale moderni-
zation of society led to increased legal complexity which, in turn,
demanded increased specialization of legal services. 2 s Economic
and societal growth and complexity produced consumer need for
adequate and reliable information about legal problems and ser-
vices. 124 During the 1950's, in response to this perceived need, na-
tional legal service organizations formed to provide inexpensive
and routine legal services. 2 ' The bar associations reacted predict-
ably and refused to allow the spread of information about these
services through advertisements. This refusal diluted the useful-
ness of the national legal service organizations.
The Supreme Court, when presented with the bar associations'
rigid prohibition on attorney advertising, struck down a blanket
ban on legal advertisements.126 The Court extended the commer-
cial speech doctrine, announced in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc. (Virginia State
Board),"22 to cover legal advertising in Bates v. Arizona.2 ' The
commercial speech doctrine covers advertisements offering prod-
ucts or services for profit or other business purposes. Such com-
112 Attanasio, supra note 83, at 503. Each amendment to the advertising prohibitions
listed in the 1908 Canons introduced a new exception to the advertising rules. See also
supra note 107 for the dates of subsequent amendments. See generally H. DRINKER, supra
note 1, at 215-18 for the exceptions introduced by each amendment.
128 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See generally Circus, Advertising: The
Profession and the Public Interest, 133 NEW L.J. 1119, 1120 (1983).
121 See Francis & Johnston, supra note 103, at 229. The complexities of modernization
prompted an ABA study to analyze the public's level of knowledge about lawyers, the law,
and the legal process. The study, reported in The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final
Report of a National Survey, determined that the public lacked awareness of when they
needed legal services, how to find lawyers to provide these services, and what lawyers' ser-
vices cost. L. ANDREWS, supra note 19, at 1.
" Francis & Johnston, supra note 103, at 229.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
127 See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text for a cursory introduction to and survey
of the commercial speech doctrine.
28 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Supreme Court labeled pharmaceutical product advertising
as commercial speech deserving first amendment protection under the Constitution. Com-
mercial speech, however, required less than the absolute protection afforded political
speech. Instead, commercial speech warranted only limited protection. The decision ap-
proved advertising regulations prohibiting untruthful commercial speech. The Court also
approved reasonable frequency, placement, and manner restrictions on advertising if they
furthered an identified and significant governmental interest. Id. at 759-71.
' 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates, decided one year after Va. State Bd., considered the con-
stitutionality of a blanket ban on attorney advertising, a question expressly reserved in the
earlier decision. See Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 773, n.25.
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mercial speech receives limited first amendment free speech pro-
tection under the Constitution. 1 0 Free speech protection precludes
absolute restraints on commercial speech. State regulation of com-
mercial speech, however, remains viable provided valid governmen-
tal interests exist to justify the regulations. " '
The Supreme Court, in Virginia State Board, advanced three
reasons for its holding. First, price advertising aided consumer de-
cision-making.8 2 Second, assisting consumer decision-making facil-
itated allocation of resources in a free market economy.1 83 Third,
advertisements conveying information useful for public decision-
making increased free market system efficiency and decreased the
need for regulation.13 4 These same three economic arguments
formed the basis for the Court's holding in Bates.13 5
The Bates Court held that the consumer's need for useful mar-
ket information outweighed the bar's interest in suppressing legal
advertisements.13 6 Traditional arguments supporting an advertis-
ing ban were specifically rejected. Advertising, they found, did not
erode professional honor and dignity.13 7 Arguments failed to per-
suade the Court that legal advertisements inherently misled con-
sumers'38 or increased litigation." 9 The Court refused to view legal
advertisements as an additional financial burden forced upon con-
sumers or as an impediment to new attorneys.14 0 The Court also
denied that advertising created unreasonable disciplinary or en-
forcement problems for the bar.1 4
The Bates decision sanctioned attorney advertising, but failed to
enunciate clear guidelines for acceptable state regulation of legal
advertisements. States revised their rules in accordance with the
decision and permitted varying degrees of legal advertising. The
newly enacted state rules covered all aspects of advertising, from
1o Commercial speech advertises products or services for profit or other business pur-
poses. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
I Id. at 383.
" Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 763.
" Id. at 765.
134 Id.
I" See generally Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-75.
1" Id. at 368.
37 Id. at 368-69.
I" Id. at 372-73.
13 Id. at 375-77.
140 The Court determined that advertisements potentially lowered legal costs and helped
steer consumers to new lawyers. Id. at 377-78.
14 Id. at 379.
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content and format restrictions to limitations as to appropriate
media.14 2 State regulations generally followed one of two alterna-
tive advertising regulation schemes proposed by the ABA after
Bates. 43 The first method consisted of a restrictive "laundry list"
of permissible advertisement information."" The second, more
'" See generally Andrews, Model Rules and Advertising, 68 ABA J. 808 (1982).
143 Report 177B to the Board of Governors, reprinted in L. ANDREWS, supra note 19, at
91-133. "Proposal A" regulated advertising and authorized certain specific forms of advertis-
ing. In contrast, "Proposal B" directed lawyers and allowed publication of virtually any in-
formation except that which was false or misleading. Id. at 92-93. See also infra note 144 for
the text of MODEL CODE DR 2-101.
144 See L. ANDREWS, supra note 19, at 102-04. The wording of "Proposal A" mirrored DR
2-101.
DR 2-101:
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any form of
public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim.
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by poten-
tial consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR
2-103 [dealing with solicitation], the following information in print media distrib-
uted or over television or radio broadcast in the geographic area or areas in which
the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's
clientele resides, provided that the information disclosed by the lawyer in such
publication or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A) and is presented in a digni-
fied manner: (1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional as-
sociates, addresses and telephone numbers; (2) One or more fields of law in which
the lawyer or law firm practices, a statement that practice is limited to one or
more fields of law, or a statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a
particular field of law practice, to the extent authorized under DR 2-105 ["Limita-
tion of Practice"]; (3) Date and place of birth; (4) Date and place of admission to
the bar of state and federal courts; (5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation,
degrees and other scholastic distinctions; (6) Public or quasi-public offices; (7)
Military service; (8) Legal authorships; (9) Legal teaching positions; (10) Member-
ships, offices, and committee assignments in bar associations; (11) Membership
and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies; (12) Technical and professional
licenses; (13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional associations
and societies; (14) Foreign language ability; (15) Names and addresses of bank
references; (16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted; (19) Office
and telephone answering service hours; (20) Fee for an initial consultation; (21)
Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees and/or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for specific services; (22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-
106(C) [No contingent fees in criminal cases], provided that the statement dis-
closes whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs; (23)
Range of fees for services, provided that the statement discloses that the specific
fee within-the range which will be charged will vary depending upon the particular
matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled without obligation
to an estimate of the fee within the range likely to be charged, in print size
equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information; (24)
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flexible, method specified only prohibited types of attorney
advertising. 1 5
The Supreme Court again considered attorney advertising in In
re R.M.J.14e After In re R.M.J., absent specific findings that listed
items misled consumers, a "laundry list" approach violated the
constitutional guarantee of free commercial speech. 147 The In re
R.M.J. Court divided advertising into three categories deserving
different degrees of protection. First, truthful advertising deserved
full first amendment protection.'" Second, inherently misleading
commercial speech deserved no protection at all and could be com-
pletely suppressed. 149 Finally, potentially misleading speech could
not be completely suppressed, but remained subject only to rea-
sonable state regulation. 50 The Court also indicated the appropri-
ate standard for state regulation of legal advertising.' 5' Appropri-
ate state regulations directly advanced an asserted and substantial
Hourly rates, provided that the statement discloses that the total fee charged will
depend upon the number of hours which must be devoted to the particular matter
to be handled for each client and the client is entitled to without obligation an
estimate of the fee likely to be charged, in print size at least equivalent to the
largest print used in setting forth the fee information.
MODEL CODE, supra note 108, at 15-17.
'" L. ANDREWS, supra note 19, at 123-25.
146 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
" Id. at 207.
148 "Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the
first amendment." In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 203. See also Comment, supra note 32, at 108.
,' "[W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inher-
ently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to
abuse, the states may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be pro-
hibited entirely." In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
80 "[TIhe states may not place an absolute prohibition on ... potentially misleading
information . . . if the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive."
Id. at 203. See also Comment, Lawyer Advertising: Permissibility of Indicating the Nature
of Legal Practice in Advertisements, 17 U. RiCH. L. REV. 171, 172 (1982).
1"1 The test advanced in In re R.M.J. first appeared in the commercial speech context in
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980):
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the first amend-
ment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must con-
cern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental inter-
est asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.
Id. See also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203, n.15. See generally Casenote, supra note 106, at
459.
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governmental interest.15 The In re R.M.J. decision thus reaffirmed
and extended the attorney's right to advertise as initially expressed
in Bates.153
The In re R.M.J. decision prompted a revision of the ABA legal
advertising regulations. Rules 7.11" and 7.2155 of the new Model
Rules for Professional Conduct, introduced in 1983,151 conform to
the In re R.M.J. holding. These rules permit a wider range of ad-
vertisements than previously contemplated. The new rules basi-
cally allow all legal advertisements unless false, deceptive, unlaw-
ful, or misleading. 5
2. England
English attitudes disfavoring attorney advertising prevailed
throughout the legal profession until 1970. In that year, The Law
Society's Monopolies and Mergers Commission issued an opinion
favoring the removal of advertising restrictions.5 8 The opinion
151 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
153 The Bates Court merely found a blanket ban on legal advertising violated the Consti-
tution. The In re R.M.J. decision struck rules allowing attorney advertising but imposing a
"laundry list" of specific form and content restrictions. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. See
generally Comment, supra note 32, at 106 for a discussion of the problematic restrictions at
issue in In re R.M.J.
1'4 Rule 7.1:
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer
or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it: (a) contains a
material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading; (b) is likely to create
an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or im-
plies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the rules of profes-
sional conduct or other law; or (c) compares the lawyer's services with other law-
yer's services unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.
MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at 153-54.
55 Rule 7.2:
(a) subject to the requirements of rule 7.1 [see supra note 154], a lawyer may
advertise services through public media, such as telephone directory, legal direc-
tory, newspaper or other periodical, outdoor, radio or television, or through writ-
ten communication not involving solicitation as defined in rule 7.3 [see infra note
1811;
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be
kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and
where it was used.
MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at 154-55.
'" The Model Rules were adopted by the ABA on August 2, 1983. MODEL RULES, supra
note 82, at 67.
'" See MODEL RULES, supra note 82, specifically the Comment to Rule 7.1 and Comment
[2] accompanying Rule 7.2. See also Attanasio, supra note 83, at 510.
I" Report by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Cmnd. No. 4463 (1970) [hereinaf-
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stated that the previous comprehensive restriction prevented effi-
cient dissemination of information by individuals and inhibited
public awareness of available legal services.159 The Commission
noted as relevant that other professionals, such as bankers, estate
agents, and accountants, who compete with solicitors for business
advertise their professional services.'
The Law Society hesitantly adopted some of the Commission's
proposals and initiated a profession-wide general advertising com-
paign on television and in the press."e' In 1978, a report by the
Royal Commission on Legal Services"8 2 strongly advocated allowing
individual solicitor advertising, subject to reasonable restric-
tions."" This report persuaded The Law Society to form an Adver-
tising Working Party in 1979 to study and evaluate the various rec-
ommendations. The Working Party announced, in a 1983 proposal,
its position favoring individual solicitor advertising."" The propo-
sal included size, format, and frequency restrictions. 65 The Law
Society Council considered the Working Party's proposal in late
1983 and tentatively announced that the total prohibition would
be lifted in 1984.166 Furthermore, regulations similar to those ad-
vanced by the Working Party would apply. 6 7 On June 27, 1984,
The Law Society Council proclaimed a solicitor's right to advertise
subject to strict media, quality, and content limitations." 8
ter cited as Cmnd. 4463].
59 Id.
"0 Id. The Commission also issued a clarifying opinion in 1976 concluding that advertis-
ing restrictions impinged on the public interest because they stifled the flow of valuable
information to consumers, frustrated competition, and detracted from public confidence in
the legal profession. Circus, supra note 123, at 1119.
' The "National Informational Campaign," funded by a mandatory ten pound surcharge
on all solicitors, provoked an inordinate amount of professional criticism. See Podmore,
Bucher and Strauss Revisited-The Case of the Solicitor's Profession, 7 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'y 1,
8 (1980). A larger number of solicitors voiced their condemnation of The Law Society's ad-
vertising campaign as unnecessary, costly, ineffective, and unprofessional. Id. See, e.g., 122
SOLIC. J. 454 (1978); 75 L. Soc'Y GAZETTE 193 (1978); 75 L. Soc'y GAZETTE 764 (1978); 123
SOLIC. J. 485 (1979); 123 SOLIc. J. 520 (1979); The Observer, 27 May 1979; 129 NEw L.J. 531
(1979); and 129 NEW L.J. 554 (1979).
162 The Royal Commission found persuasive the argument that a solicitor who competes
directly with non-solicitors such as bankers, who may advertise, should be able to compete
on equal terms. See Circus, supra note 123, at 1121.
"' Report of the Royal Commission on Legal Services, Cmnd. No. 7648 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Cmnd. 7648].
16 See Merricks, Individual Advertising-At Last, 133 NEw L.J. 1028 (1983).
1 Id.
' Council Statement (1984), supra note 2, at 2962.
167 Id.
10I Id. at 1802.
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B. Right to Advertise Regulations
Both England and the United States circumscribe legal advertis-
ing rights. The regulations governing English and United States
advertisements provide a useful basis for a comparison of the right
to advertise legal services in the two countries. Restrictions on le-
gal advertising may be subdivided into three distinct categories:
format rules, quality standards, and content controls.
1. Format Rules
Format rules generally consist of frequency, placement, and
manner of advertisement limitations. Frequency limitations re-
strict the timing of advertisements. Placement limitations concern
types of acceptable advertising media. Manner limitations indicate
size or method of acceptable advertisements. Format rules impose
external restraints in the sense that they place objective physical
limitations on advertisements.
The Law Society announcement contained only a placement lim-
itation.""9 The Working Party initially recommended additional
format rules concerning both size, a manner limitation, and timing,
a frequency limitation, for acceptable legal advertisements. The
Working Party suggested total advertisement size no larger than
six inches square, uniform type size, and a frequency limitation of
only one advertisement per week.17 The Council announcement,
however, failed to include these specific restrictions.17 1
The Law Society Council announced that solicitors could adver-
tise only in certain approved media formats. The Council an-
nouncement imposed a placement limitation confining solicitors'
advertisements to press, radio, and business premises, and limited
direct mailings to the solicitor's professional connections.1 72 The
list excluded television advertisements, general mailings, 3 and
'" See supra note 4 for text of The Law Society Council's announcement.
17 See Merricks, supra note 164, at 1028. See supra note 164 and accompanying text
concerning the Advertising Working Party recommendations.
17 See supra note 4 for the text of The Law Society Council announcement. The Law
Society may have intended to incorporate these restrictions within the broad, ambiguous
wording of the quality restriction. See also infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text for a
full discussion of the Council announcement's quality restrictions.
171 Council Statement (1984), supra note 2, at 1802.
173 This exclusion presumably encompasses advertisements in general mailings such as an
estate agent brochure or other types of client leaflets for distribution. Limiting mail adver-
tisements to solicitor's "professional connections" effectively limits mailings to only clients
or former clients.
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non-traditional1 7 ' media formats. Unless qualified, the term
"press" includes legal and nonlegal publications, local or national
newspapers, as well as limited and general circulation periodicals.
The Council apparently rejected the Working Party's proposal
confining solicitors' advertisements to local weekly or evening
newspapers.7 5
The ABA Model Rules, containing the lawyer's right to advertise
in the United States, eliminates format restrictions. Rule 7.2176 of
the Model Rules allows lawyer advertising in all "public media. 177
"Public media" include traditional advertising formats such as
newspapers, periodicals, television, radio, and signs77 and, addi-
tionally, presumably encompass non-traditional media such as
videos, billboards, banners, and handbills.179 Furthermore, rule 7.2
allows lawyer advertising through written communications not in-
volving solicitation 80 as described in rule 7.3.1s1 Rules 7.2 and 7.3,
read in conjunction, anticipate and approve not only direct mail-
ings to clients or former clients, but also random general mailings
to members of the public. The solicitation ban contained in rule
7.3 precludes only targeted written communications.' 82 Rule 7.2 be-
171 Other forms of "non-traditional" media include billboards or other signs erected off
solicitors' business premises, airplane banners, signs attached to trucks or cars, T-shirts, and
handbills. L. ANDREWS, supra note 19, at 11-12.
,71 This conclusion results from the fact that the announcement failed to limit solicitor
advertisements to only local weekly or evening papers. See supra note 4 for text of The
Council announcement.
17' See supra note 155 for the text of rule 7.2.
17 A lawyer may not, however, solicit legal business according to the prohibition in rule
7.3. See infra note 181 for the text of rule 7.3.
MIs Rule 7.2 volunteers the following as "public media": telephone and legal directories,
newspapers and other periodicals, outdoors advertisements, radio, television, or written
communications not involving solicitation. See also supra note 155 for the text of rule 7.2.
179 Id.
IS0 See supra note 111 for the definition of "solicitation."
18) Rule 7.3:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mall, in-per-
son or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by telephone or tel-
egraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific
recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distrib-
uted generally to persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided by
the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in gen-
eral find such services useful.
MODEL RULES, supra note 82, at 156-57.
182 For example, rule 7.3 prohibits letters to airplane crash victims stating that the firm
specializes in aviation cases, or letters to defective Ford Pinto owners claiming firm exper-
tise in products liability litigation. Letters containing essentially the same information but
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stows broad discretion on lawyers in terms of advertisement fre-
quency, placement, and manner.183
Timing, placement, and manner advertising restraints undenia-
bly contravene the spirit and probably also the letter of the In re
R.M.J. holding. In re R.M.J. circumscribed state bar associations'
legal advertising regulatory powers by delineating permissible
boundaries for restraints. The holding invalidated many states' ad-
vertising rules and cast a legal shadow over the ABA advertising
regulations found in Canon 2 and the accompanying Ethical Con-
siderations (EC's) and Disciplinary Rules (DR's). Only a prior
finding that a regulated advertising practice misled or potentially
misled consumers justified imposition of the regulation."" Under
this exacting standard, format restrictions proved untenable and
the newly promulgated ABA Model Rules relaxed or eliminated
the previous restrictive provisions contained in the Code. 85
Format rules such as frequency, placement, or manner of adver-
tisement limitations impose external, physical restraints on adver-
tisements. The English solicitors' right to advertise specifies only a
placement limitation restricting solicitors' advertisements to cer-
tain approved media. The In re R.M.J. decision invalidated format
rules delimiting United States lawyers' advertisements.
2. Quality Standards
Quality standards act as internal restraints on advertisements.
They set aspirational goals, usually in the form of general and am-
biguous objectives. Such standards necessitate subjective interpre-
tation. Terms such as "professional," "reputable," "honorable,"
"dignified," "tasteful," and "truthful" exemplify advertising qual-
ity standards.
The English solicitors' right to advertise allows only tasteful,
reputable, 86 and truthful 8 ' advertisements. The tasteful and rep-
mailed randomly to the general public fall outside the prohibition on solicitation. Solicita-
tion occurs when there is an identifiable target group for such mailings. See, e.g., Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 (1977).
"I3 Neither frequency nor size limitations restrict lawyer advertisements. See supra note
155 for the text of rule 7.2.
I" In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 207. See also supra notes 146-57 and accompanying text
discussing the impact of the In re R.M.J. decision on legal advertising regulations.
188 See supra notes 154 (text of rule 7.1), 155 (text of rule 7.2), and 181 (text of rule 7.3).
1 "The advertising must be in good taste and not of such a character as may reasonably
be regarded as likely to bring the profession into disrepute." Council Statement (1984),
supra note 2, at 1802. See also supra note 4 for the complete text of the 1984 Council
Statement approving solicitor's advertisements.
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utable elements of the English quality standards stem from tradi-
tional notions of professional honor and dignity.188 Both terms,
"tasteful" and "reputable," evade precise definition and provide
little direct guidance for advertising solicitors. The truthfulness
standard, on the other hand, sets slightly clearer parameters. A
truthful advertisement does not mislead and contains only factu-
ally verifiable information.
The "good taste" requirement sets a flexible, but ambiguous and
subjective quality standard.189 An appeal to "good taste" reminds
solicitors of the high level of conduct expected of them. Profes-
sional traditions define the general outer boundaries of "good
taste." Time and future disciplinary actions will resolve some of
the ambiguities inherent in the nebulous requirement of "good
taste" as advertising solicitors seek to find the precise limits of the
requirement.
"Reputable," like "good taste," fails to elucidate an unequivocal
advertising guideline. The "reputable" standard, like the "good
taste" requirement, seeks to protect the professional interest in
maintaining honor, dignity, and public esteem. The standard states
that a solicitor's advertisement may not be "of such a character as
• . .likely to bring the profession into disrepute."' 90 "Reputable"
again presents a nebulous standard and fails to provide an unam-
biguous guideline for a solicitor's advertisements.
The truthfulness requirement contains a more helpful standard
for solicitor advertisements. A truthful advertisement excludes any
inaccurate statement, unverifiable assertion, or other factually mis-
leading information."9 Truthful advertisements contain only accu-
187 "The advertising must not contain any inaccurate or misleading statement and any
factual information must be verifiable." Council Statement, (1984), supra note 2, at 1802.
See also supra note 4 for the complete text of The Law Society Council announcement.
1" See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text regarding English legal traditions de-
manding professional honor and dignity.
188 The scope of the "good taste" requirement lacks precise boundaries. For example, does
the "good taste" standard encompass size or frequency of advertisements? If so, it imposes
additional time, placement, and manner restrictions. Does "good taste" preclude advertising
in certain types of media? If so, it imposes an additional format rule. See supra notes 169-75
and accompanying text for a discussion of these restrictions. Does the "good taste" element
include restraints on advertisement content? If so, it involves additional content controls.
See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of content controls. The
inherent ambiguities in the "good taste" standard produce a myriad of interpretive difficul-
ties for solicitors wishing to advertise.
1 See supra note 4 for full text of the requirement of reputable advertising character.
ion See supra note 4 for the full text of the requirement for truthful advertising.
A minor point for clarification arises from the verification requirement. Must solicitors
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rate, verifiable information. Inaccurate, misleading, or unverifiable
ones perpetrate a fraud on consumers and therefore contradict
public policy. Verifiability checks solicitors by putting them on no-
tice that any advertised assertions must be factually supportable
and worthy of consumer reliance.
The ABA Model Rules governing legal advertisements in the
United States, in contrast to the English Law Society rules, do not
urge nebulous quality standards.192 The Model Rules instead re-
quire only truthfulness in lawyer advertising.
Rule 7.1193 acts as the sole quality restraint on attorney advertis-
ing in the United States. Rule 7.1 disallows any false or misleading
statements.194 The rule defines a false or misleading statement as a
material misrepresentation or omission, a statement leading to an
unjustified expectation, or a comparison of legal services lacking
factual substantiation. 195 Rule 7.2(b)196 adds a verification element
and demands that lawyers retain copies of their advertisements for
a period of two years.
Rule 7.1, disallowing false or misleading statements in lawyer ad-
vertisements, resembles but improves upon the truthfulness stan-
dard imposed upon English solicitors. The Law Society announce-
ment contains a bald prohibition on inaccurate or misleading
information, but rule 7.1 goes beyond a mere prohibition and de-
fines the terms "false" or "misleading."
The definition of false and misleading contained in rule 7.1 in-
cludes outright falsehoods, materially misleading statements, or
retain copies of their advertisements for verification purposes? The logical answer to this
question is yes, but the Council failed to make the point clear. For evidentiary purposes,
solicitors would be well advised to retain copies of their advertisements, considering the
numerous restrictions on solicitor advertising. The Law Society Council may wish to modify
the rules on advertising and require solicitors to file copies of their advertisements with The
Law Society for monitoring and verifying ease. Alternatively, The Council could demand
that solicitors keep copies of their advertisements for a stipulated period of time, similar to
the ABA requirement (rule 7.2) that lawyers retain advertisement copies for a two year
period. See supra note 155 for the text of rule 7.2.
19' The Model Code of Professional Responsibility ambiguously referred to maintaining
the dignity of the legal profession in EC 1-5. EC 1-5 stated: "A lawyer should maintain high
standards of professional conduct and should encourage fellow lawyers to do likewise. He
should be temperate and dignified, and he should refrain from all illegal and morally repre-
hensible conduct." MoDEL CODE, supra note 108, at 6.
In addition, Canon 9 stressed that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of pro-
fessional impropriety." Id. at 52.
"" See supra note 154 for the text of rule 7.1.
194 Id.
199 Id.
19 See supra note 155 for the full text of rule 7.2.
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materially misleading omissions. Not only does a positive assertion
qualify under this definition, but a failure to convey all necessary
information also constitutes false or misleading advertising. The
definition further adds statements creating false hopes to the list
of improper advertising information. This element of the definition
protects the consumer reliance interest by barring statements war-
ranting, without justification, a certain result. Finally, the defini-
tion lists legal service comparisons as a false or misleading adver-
tising technique, unless factual substantiation exists supporting
the contention. Quality of service comparisons, long recognized as
unacceptable. 19 7 pose obvious dangers due to the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of evaluation or verification of such claims.
Rule 7.2 checks advertising lawyers and requires precise record-
keeping for two years after dissemination of an advertisement. Re-
quiring explicit records eases verification of advertised information
and enforcement of the advertising rules. In addition, it puts ad-
vertising lawyers on notice of the seriousness of the advertising
restrictions.
English and United States legal advertising rules differ substan-
tially in terms of quality standards. English solicitors' advertise-
ments must measure up under indefinite and subjectively deter-
mined quality standards such as good taste and reputable
advertising character. Standards of truthfulness and verifiability
also constrain advertising solicitors. In contrast, only standards of
veracity and verifiability delimit United States attorneys' adver-
tisements. United States legal advertising rules, moreover, attempt
to spell out clearly the boundaries of "truthfulness" in legal adver-
tising by defining false or misleading information. Lawyers who ad-
vertise must also retain copies of advertisements and meticulous
records for verification purposes.
3. Content Restrictions
Content controls explicitly restrict the array of permissible ad-
vertisement information. Like quality standards, content controls
act as internal restraints on advertisement messages. Content con-
trols generally resemble either a catalogue of advertising "thou
shalt nots" or a "laundry list" of permissible information. 19
The English right to advertise announcement lists advertising
197 See Canby, Commercial Speech of Lawyers: The Court's Unsteady Course, 46 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 401, 416 (1980).
'98 Andrews, supra note 142, at 809.
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"thou shalt nots."' 99 For example, improper solicitor advertisement
information includes specific references to quality of work, quan-
tity of work, clients represented, staff members other than part-
ners, fee income, past cases, success rate, or claims of specialization
or expertise.200 The announcement permits advertisement of solici-
tors' fees, but imposes a number of qualifications.2 1
Each prohibited advertisement content category addresses a top-
ical area potentially misleading for consumers. The rationale be-
hind exclusion of these contextual areas looks to the function of
legal advertising: presentation of pertinent and reliable informa-
tion useful for consumer decision-making. The rationale for exclu-
sion stems from the affirmative determination that these content
areas fail to further the intended purpose of legal advertising. As-
sertions on the forbidden topics, moreover, not only fail to further
the purpose, but also raise the danger of consumer misinformation.
The list of "thou shalt nots" therefore seeks to protect impression-
able and naive consumers.
Price advertising, although permitted by The Law Society an-
nouncement, remains subject to a variety of restrictions. Price ad-
vertising restraints purport to protect consumer expectations.
Qualifications on fee advertising preemptively anticipate and pre-
vent dissemination of potentially misleading fee information. Fee
advertising requires disclosure of information such as the precise
legal services covered by the fee, the circumstances under which an
advertised fee increases, a clear explanation or "break-down" of
the fee, and whether the advertised fee includes disbursements and
applicable taxes.20 2 A bald statement of a charge for a specific ser-
vice, such as "DIVORCES .. .ONLY £150!!," obviously violates
the fee advertising rules. The rules generally attempt to protect
'" See supra note 4 for the text of the English legal advertising right.
,oo An advertisement may include information regarding the quality of a solicitor's ser-
vices in general terms provided the advertisement includes no claims of superiority, nor any
specific criticisms, nor comparisons with regard to other solicitors. See supra note 4 for the
text of the English right to advertise (section 3(a) in particular). Advertisements may con-
tain categories of preferred work provided the firm has experience in the advertised areas.
The categories of information excluded by the right to advertise announcement presuma-
bly represent areas which The Law Society Council perceived as inherently misleading for
the general public or as irrelevant for the informed selection of a solicitor. See supra note 4
for the text of the English right to advertise (sections 3(b) and 4 in particular).
'10 See supra note 4 for the text of the English right to advertise (sections 5(a) through
5(e) in particular).
"' See supra note 4 for the text of the English right to advertise (sections 5(a) through
5(c) in particular).
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unsophisticated consumers by preventing the advertisement of
confusing or incomplete price information.
The restrictive Law Society list of "thou shalt nots," including
the qualifications on solicitor price advertising, resembles the old
rule governing lawyer advertisements found in DR 2-101.2o3 The In
re R.M.J. decision, however, cast the constitutional validity of con-
tent regulations such as DR 2-101 into question. The In re R.M.J.
Court struck down a similar "laundry list" of approved content in-
formation for legal advertisements. 20 4 According to the Court, free
commercial speech under the Constitution precludes content re-
strictions, unless promulgated pursuant to specific findings that
the information banned by the regulation misleads or potentially
misleads consumers.20 5
Under the reasoning advanced in In re R.M.J., content restric-
tions similar to those imposed on English solicitors violate consti-
tutional principles of free commercial speech. Content restrictions,
unless preceded by a specific finding of potential consumer confu-
sion, improperly infringe upon lawyers' rights to advertise and con-
sumers' right to legal information.
The new Model Rules, promulgated antecedent to In re R.M.J.,
eliminate all content controls save one. Rule 7.2(d)20 e requires that
legal advertisements contain the name of a lawyer taking responsi-
bility for the advertised information. This requirement serves as a
warning to advertising lawyers that they will be held accountable
for advertised information. It also eases verification of advertised
assertions and overall enforcement of legal advertising rules. The
Model Rules contain no other content control.
Content controls focus on the advertisement message. They pro-
hibit advertisement of certain specified types of information or de-
mand inclusion of qualifying information. Content controls on En-
glish solicitors' advertisements resemble a list of "thou shalt nots."
In re R.M.J., in contrast, freed United States attorneys' advertise-
ments from most content controls. Content controls generally con-
tradict the spirit of free commercial speech, guaranteed by the
Constitution, and, as such, meet with judicial disfavor.
303 See supra note 144 for text of DR 2-101.
'o In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 207. See generally Andrews, supra note 142, at 809; L. AN-
DREWS, supra note 19, at 57-59. See also supra note 13 and accompanying text with regard
to the differing constitutional standards imposed on political versus commercial speech.
o In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 207.
'o See supra note 155 for the full text of rule 7.2.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Law Society Council announcement proclaimed a limited
right to advertise for solicitors. Solicitors' advertisements, however,
must strictly adhere to numerous format, quality, and content reg-
ulations. The restrictive English position provides a direct contrast
to the relatively permissive attitude taken toward legal advertising
in the United States. The English right-to-advertise regulations,
moreover, contain several ambiguities.
The restrictive stance taken by The Law Society Council devel-
oped as a result of long-standing English legal tradition. Tradition
played an important role in English legal system formation. The
legal profession considered tradition at least as important, if not
more important, than formal written rules governing professional
conduct. The traditional attitude opposing legal advertising ex-
erted a strong influence on The Council and the announcement al-
lowing solicitors' advertisements accurately reflected the profes-
sion's reluctance in this area.
The permissive American attitude toward legal advertising de-
veloped over time. Colonial America initially followed English tra-
dition and banned attorney advertisements. Tradition, however,
failed to present a formidable obstacle when directly confronted
with the constitutional guarantee of free commercial speech. Con-
stitutional protection assured the eventual relaxation if not actual
demise of advertising restrictions and inevitably led to the current
permissive position.
Legal advertising, although sanctioned in England by The Law
Society, has not received wide acceptance within the profession.
Traditional notions of honor and dignity still prevail and most so-
licitors feel advertising offends tradition and erodes professional
honor and dignity. Solicitors cherish public esteem. Thus, public
opposition to legal advertising acts as a very persuasive disincen-
tive for solicitor advertising. Until tradition or public perceptions
change, legal advertisements are destined to relative obscurity in
England.
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